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A Dual-Process Model of Economic Decision Making: The Symmetric Effect of Intuitive 
and Cognitive Judgments on Optimal Budget Allocation 
 
Angelos Stamos, Sabrina Bruyneel, Bram De Rock, Laurens Cherchye, Siegfried Dewitte 
 
Abstract: Understanding the influence of dual-processing system on budget waste resulting from 
choice inconsistencies is critical in helping individuals maximize decision utility. In two studies 
we rely on the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) to explore the severity of 
choice inconsistencies resulting from intuitive and cognitive judgments separately, as well as 
overall severity across the two types of judgments. We focus on choice inconsistency that leads 
to the inefficient use of individuals’ budget and not on the simple preferences divergence that 
may result from the two types of judgment. We find that budget waste resulting from intuitive 
and cognitive judgments is comparable, but that overall budget waste across the two types of 
judgments is significantly higher. These findings suggest that the inconsistency in choices 
resulting from intuitive versus cognitive judgments is responsible for significant loss of decision 
utility in individuals’ economic decisions, rather than choice inconsistencies resulting from a 
specific type of evaluation in itself. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of our 
findings.  
 
Keywords: Choice inconsistency, Intuitive judgments, Cognitive Judgments, Budget waste, 
GARP, Decision making 
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One of the basic goals of individuals when they go shopping is to choose products that 
maximize their utility given the available budget. However, very often people make inconsistent 
decisions, potentially resulting in inefficient budget use and a loss of utility (Kahneman, 2003; 
Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). Understanding this process is essential in order to help individuals 
improve the quality of their decisions, and as a result to enhance their welfare (Ratner et al., 
2008).  
A lot of research has linked inconsistent choices to behavior triggered by two different types 
of judgments, often referred to as intuitive and cognitive (Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). Intuitive 
judgments are relatively automatic, quick and effortless, whereas cognitive judgments are more 
deliberate, slow and effortful. Previous research has investigated the role of both types of 
judgments in choice inconsistencies. However, some important questions remain unanswered: 
Which type of judgment can lead to more severe inconsistencies? Can such inconsistencies lead 
to a significant waste of money? To the best of our knowledge, there is no study investigating 
whether inconsistent choices resulting from reliance on either intuitive or cognitive judgments 
lead to inefficient use of individuals’ budget and thus waste of money.  
Relying on the theory of revealed preferences and the Afriat Index1, we develop a task that 
allows us to investigate severity of choice inconsistencies created by the two types of judgments. 
We do this by capturing budget loss resulting from choice behaviors relying on either type of 
judgments. Apart from quantifying severity of choice inconsistencies, our task adds to existing 
studies investigating decision quality in relation to intuitive versus cognitive judgments in 
several ways. First, our approach is non-parametric, which means that it does not rely on 
 
1 The Afriat Index is a goodness-of-fit measure that quantifies how close the observed behavior is to rational 
behavior (i.e. a consumer maximizing preferences subject to her budget constraint). See Choi et al. (2007) for a 
detailed discussion of the Afriat Index that we use in the current study. 
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spurious assumptions regarding the functional structure of preferences. Second, it allows to test 
choice consistency in a non-binary paradigm and thus to account for menu dependence effects 
(menu dependence effects arise when the choice can vary parametrically with which collection 
of alternatives is available for choice). Last but not least, our task allows us to account for the 
simple and rational change of preferences between the two types of judgments by focusing only 
on inconsistent choices that lead to inefficient use of individuals’ budget.   
We organize the article as follows. First, we review dual-process theories of decision 
making, and discuss key findings about how both intuitive and cognitive judgments can lead to 
inconsistent choices. Next, we introduce the theory of revealed preferences and the Afriat Index, 
and explain how those can assess choice inconsistency severity and quantify budget waste. We 
present two studies investigating budget waste triggered by the two types of judgments, and we 
conclude with a discussion of the results and their implications.  
 
Dual-Process Theory 
One of the important assumptions in behavioral science is that decision making is driven by 
two types of processes, intuition and cognition. Several studies have relied on this distinction 
between intuition and cognition, although different authors have been using different labels to 
refer to it, including (but not constrained to) nonverbal versus verbal processes (Paivio, 1986), 
associative versus rule‐based system (Sloman, 1996),  type I versus type II processes (Kahneman 
& Frederick, 2002), hot versus cold system (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), reflexive versus 
reflective system (Lieberman et al., 2002), and experiential versus rational system 
(Epstein, 1994, 2003). Intuitive judgments are quick and heuristic-based, whereas cognitive 
judgments are deliberate and rule-based. The main features of intuition are its automatic 
operation and minimal demands on working memory. Intuition operates mostly through 
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components of associative memory, meaning that different associations emerge spontaneously 
and influence behavior. It tends to be rapid, unconscious, and uncontrollable (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). In contrast, the main features of cognition are the active engagement of 
working memory and analytical thinking. Cognitive processing happens willfully, and is effortful 
most of the time. It tends to be slow, conscious, and controllable (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). It is 
important to note that this distinction between intuition and cognition is not definitive. That is, 
intuition and cognition do not act in isolation from each other:  both are almost always active 
simultaneously. However, in some cases intuition puts more weight into the decisions, while in 
some other instances cognition is mainly responsible for the choices (Dhar & Gorlin, 2012). 
Neuroscience has added evidence for the existence of this intuitive versus cognitive 
distinction. Several studies have shown a relationship between automatic responses and activity 
in the limbic system (anterior cingulate and amygdala) on the one hand, and a relationship 
between more analytic and controlled processes and activity in the frontal regions of the brain 
such as the prefrontal and orbital cortex (LeDoux, 1996; McClure et al., 2004; Panksepp, 2004) 
on the other. Awareness that such differences in processing exist has triggered a growing interest 
in the role of these different types of processing in decision making. Several studies have 
investigated the influence of intuitive and cognitive processing on the quality of individuals’ 
decisions, which we discuss next. 
 
Dual Processing and Loss of Utility  
A stream of research has shown that cognitive judgments can have a negative impact on 
decision quality. This negative impact (in the form of suboptimal choices) can potentially lead to 
budget waste. According to this literature, cognition can hinder systematic processing in 
individuals’ decisions (Toresdillas & Chaiken, 1999). Specifically, cognition has been regarded a 
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form of distraction which can pull attention away from the most relevant information, and as 
such lead to inconsistent behavior. For instance, Lee et al. (2009) showed in four studies that 
more cognitive processing can lead to more transitivity errors. In these studies, transitivity was 
defined as a well‐defined preference structure, such that for any set of bundles a, b, and c, if a R 
b and b R c, it must also be the case that a R c. In another study, Nordgren & Dijksterhuis (2009) 
showed that more deliberation led to a less consistent attitude towards products.  
Studies on (un)conscious thought and decision making also show that cognitive judgments 
can lead to less accurate decisions in some situations (Dijksterhuis, 2004; Dijksterhuis et al., 
2006). For instance, in Dijksterhuis’ (2004) study participants had to choose their favorite 
product (e.g. apartment or car) from a hypothetical set of options; some of the options had more 
positive attributes than other options. Participants who deliberated more chose significantly 
fewer options with positive attributes than participants who made a more intuitive choice. 
According to the authors, conscious thinking led to less polarized, clear, and integrated 
representations in memory and prevented meaningful clustering.  Combined, although these 
studies do not provide measures on the severity of inconsistencies nor potential waste of budget, 
they provide a good indication that cognitive judgments can contribute to loss of utility.   
On the other hand, several studies suggest that utility loss from suboptimal choices can stem 
from intuitive judgments. A lot of behaviors that can be viewed as suboptimal, such as lack of 
self-control and hyperbolic discounting, are attributed to intuition (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1998; 
Wertenbroch 2003). According to the traditional economic point of view (Thaler & Shefrin, 
1981), a person consists of two inner selves, a planner (cognition) and a doer (intuition), at any 
point in time. The planner is responsible for utility maximization whereas the doer, who exists 
only in the current period, is selfish and myopic. The planner is responsible for the more virtuous 
decisions which maximize long-term utility, whereas the doer often succumbs to indulgence and 
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is responsible for impulsive behaviors and loss of long-term utility. In line with this view, 
O’Donoghue & Rabin (1999) showed that typical decisions based on intuition such as immediate 
gratification can cause welfare loss which may be severe on several occasions. In an 
experimental study, Van den Bergh, Dewitte & Warlop (2008) found that “hot” stimuli inducing 
intuitive processing led individuals to become more impulsive in the pursuit of monetary 
rewards. Furthermore, Shiv et al. (2005) showed that participants able to use their emotions 
made less advantageous investment decisions and thus gained less money than participants not 
able to use their emotions (due to brain damage) and thus relying on cognition only for making 
decisions. Studies on resource depletion showed that depleted consumers, who are considered to 
rely on intuition, were willing to pay significantly higher amounts of money for the same 
products than consumers who were not previously depleted (e.g. Bruyneel et al., 2006).  Taken 
together, this set of studies suggests that intuitive judgments can contribute to loss of utility. 
None of these studies provides insights in the severity of this utility loss or the potential budget 
waste related to it, however.   
Adopting yet another perspective, some studies suggest that loss of utility (and/or budget 
waste) does not necessarily result from a specific type of judgment (i.e., from either intuitive or 
cognitive processing), but rather from a potential discrepancy between types of processing and/or 
decision situations. For instance, Read & Loewenstein (1995) found that when people choose 
multiple goods simultaneously (for instance during grocery shopping), they choose more variety 
of products than when they choose these goods sequentially (i.e., known as the “diversification 
bias”). According to the authors, this discrepancy in desired variety can potentially lead to 
inconsistent choices and loss of utility over time. Investigating the diversification bias further, 
Read et al. (1999) concluded that what appears to be desirable locally might not be likeable when 
adopting a more global perspective.  
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Furthermore, some other studies suggest that loss of utility caused by choice discrepancy 
might result from discrepant forecasting between different types of judgments (Kahneman and 
Snell 2002; Kahneman and Thaler 2006; Fisher and Rangel 2014). For instance, Read and van 
Leeuwen (1996) showed that when people were hungry, they tended to choose more unhealthy 
food products compared to when they were satiated. In a similar vein, Fisher and Rangel (2014) 
found that when hungry, individuals tend to evaluate all food items higher than when satiated. In 
general, when individuals use one type of judgment (for example their cognition), they are not 
able to correctly predict their own preferences resulting from the other type of judgement (for 
example their intuition). Fisher & Rangel (2014) also observed these mispredictions to be 
symmetric (i.e., they occurred from intuitive to cognitive and from cognitive to intuitive). 
However, evaluating food differently or choosing different food items does not necessarily lead 
to waste of money (see method section and discussion for more detailed examples). To the best 
of our knowledge, none of these studies has investigated whether these mispredictions can lead 
to inconsistent choices severe enough to end up in a loss of budget.  
To summarize, findings on the influence of cognitive and intuitive judgments on utility loss 
are equivocal. There are studies implying that utility loss is driven by cognitive judgments, but 
there are also studies hinting at the idea that intuitive judgments lead to loss of utility. Yet other 
studies adopt a more neutral position, and suggest that a discrepancy between decision situations 
(and decision processes) may trigger inconsistent decisions, and thus result in an overall loss of 
utility. However, none of the studies has used a direct measure of severity of inconsistent choices 
involving conditions with different price regimes and budget restrictions. We do precisely that by 
employing a measure capturing the severity of choice inconsistencies (and goes beyond just a 
mere preference change), and translate this into budget loss. We believe that an investigation that 
does this could be very helpful in shedding light on the drivers of loss of utility. We will conduct 
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such an investigation, and use the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) and the 
Afriat Index to examine choice behavior in terms of efficient budget use. We introduce GARP 
and the Afriat Index next. 
 
Revealed Preferences and the Afriat Index Efficiency 
According to the traditional view in economics, preference consistency is a prerequisite for 
utility maximizing behavior (Choi et al., 2007). However, not all inconsistent choices have an 
equally significant negative impact on how efficiently people use their budgets (Harbaugh et al., 
2001; Echenique, Lee, & Shum, 2011). In order to estimate utility loss triggered by inconsistent 
choices one could calculate how severe observed choice inconsistencies are. Revealed preference 
theory and the Afriat Index allow us to do this, as they translate choice consistency violations 
into an estimation of waste of budget.  
Revealed preference theory was initiated by Samuelson (1938), according to whom a chosen 
bundle of goods xi is “directly revealed preferred” over some other bundle xt, if xi is chosen 
when xt is also in the budget set (i.e. xt is not more expensive than xi at the prevailing prices pi). 
If the individual (as a utility maximizer) always chooses the best bundle s/he can get, then, if xi is 
revealed preferred to xt, s/he must never choose xt when xi is available. This requirement is 
called the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). 
Varian (1982) formulated the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP)2, which 
makes use of indirect revealed preferences. A chosen bundle of goods xi is “indirectly revealed 
preferred” over some other bundle xt, if and only if  there exists a sequence of bundles xj, xk ,… , 
xs such that xi is directly preferred over xj, xj is directly preferred over xk, … , and xs is directly 
 
2 GARP is a restatement of cyclical consistency condition introduced by Afriat (1967). 
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preferred over xt.. According to GARP, if a bundle xi is indirectly revealed preferred to xt, then xt 
is not strictly directly revealed preferred to xi, that is, xi is not strictly within the budget set when 
xt is chosen. Varian proved that GARP provides a necessary and sufficient condition for 
decision-makers’ choices to be consistent with the maximization of a concave, positive 
monotonic, locally non-satiated and continuous utility function.  
Figure 1 exhibits a GARP violation, which consists of a choice inconsistency that ends up in 
waste of budget.3 Suppose an individual wants to dedicate a budget of 120$ between 2 products 
X and Y. When the prices are p1 (a price of 12 for X and a price of 8 for Y) the individual can 
buy all combinations below the budget line b1. Suppose the individual chooses to buy the 
combination A (X=8, Y=3). When the prices change to p2 (a price of 8 for X and a price of 12 
for Y) all possible combinations that lie in the area below the budget line b2 can be bought. 
Should the individual choose to buy the combination B(X=3, Y=8), this would violate GARP as 
bundle A is revealed preferred to bundle B, and bundle B is strictly revealed preferred to bundle 
A. By choosing combination B the individual actually wastes money as, for the given prices p2, 
the revealed preferred bundle A was available at a lower cost (equal to 8*8+3*12=100$) than the 
chosen bundle B (in which case s/he pays 3*8+8*12=120$). In our example the individual thus 
failed to maximize the utility of the given budget as s/he chose bundle A over B at prices p1 when 
B was cheaper (8*12+3*8=120$ for A and 8*8+3*12=100$ for B), while s/he also chose bundle 
B over A at prices p2 when bundle A was cheaper (8*8+3*12=100$ for A and 8*12+3*8=120$ 
 
3 The illustration in Figure 1 is actually a violation of WARP (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference), which is 
generally weaker than GARP. WARP and GARP have the same empirical implications in the case of two 
commodities and linear budgets, as in this example. See Uzawa (1960), Gale (1960) and Heufer (2014) for detailed 
discussions on differences in empirical content of WARP and GARP. (Strictly speaking, these authors consider SARP 
(Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference) instead of GARP. See, for example, Varian (1982) for the subtle difference 
between SARP and GARP.) In this respect, we note that our experiments consider consumption bundles with up to 
four commodities. In such instances, GARP has generally stronger empirical implications than WARP. 
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for B). In each situation s/he spent 120$ (240$ in total). If s/he had chosen B over A at prices p1 
and A over B at prices p2 s/he would have spent 100$ in each situation (200$ in total) and ended 
up with the same quantities of products. This difference of 40$ constitutes waste of budget.  
Below we will introduce the Afriat Index as a measure for the efficiency of individuals’ choices, 
which captures exactly this idea of budget waste associated with behavior that violates GARP.  
 
The essence of revealed preference theory and GARP lies in the concept of indifference 
curves. Indifference curves show the different bundles of goods between which a decision maker 
is indifferent. In other words, indifference curves show the quantity of product X an individual is 
willing to sacrifice to get a certain quantity of product Y. A utility maximizing individual always 
wants to move to higher indifference curves as s/he gets better bundles of products, meaning that 
s/he can combine the same quantity of X with larger quantities of Y (see figure 2) and vice versa.  
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In the case of the above example, a choice that maximizes the utility of the available budget 
at prices p2, given the fact that the individual chose the combination A (X=8, Y=3) at prices p1, 
would be combinations placed on the dotted section of the budget line b2, for example the 
combination D (X=12, Y=2) in figure 3. Choosing these combinations would allow the 
individual to move to higher indifferences curves and end up with bundles containing larger 
quantities of products. However, choosing combination B (X=3, Y = 8) would not.  
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An important question pertains to the way GARP can reveal inconsistencies that go beyond 
a simple change in choice patterns. As one can observe, GARP does not necessarily punish every 
change in choices but merely those that are harmful for the efficient use of the available budget. 
Figure 4 exhibits how individuals can change their consumption patterns and in one instance for 
example choose a bundle with larger quantities of product X (choice B) and in another instance 
choose a bundle of goods containing larger quantities of product Y (choice A) without violating 
GARP (and thus without wasting budget). 
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Afriat (1972a; 1972b) has introduced an efficiency index which can be used to measure the 
severity of GARP violations. This measure has been developed in the context of budget waste. 
As explained above, a violation of GARP can be interpreted as a waste of money. Basically, the 
Afriat Index measures the overall efficiency of individuals’ choices as the fraction of their 
budget that is wasted when GARP is violated (see Afriat (1973) and Varian (1990, 1991) for 
precise formal definitions). The index can take values between 0 and 1. A value of 1 means that 
there are no GARP violations (and no budget is wasted), whereas a value below 1 reveals that 
GARP is violated (with corresponding budget waste). Lower index values indicate that a larger 
fraction of the budget is wasted. In general, more severe inconsistencies in choices have a bigger 
impact on the Afriat Index. For example, the situation in the left panel of figure 5 implies a less 
severe GARP violation and, therefore, a higher value for the Afriat Index than the situation in the 
right panel of figure 5. 
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Several studies have used revealed preferences in experimental settings to investigate 
whether people behave consistently. Battalio et al. (1973) used data from choices made by 
female patients at a psychiatric hospital. Participants bought goods at a commissary, where the 
prices were arranged to change periodically. Between 5 and 50 percent of participants made 
choices that violated revealed preference axioms of choice consistency. In a sample of college 
students, Sippel (1997) studied choices for eight different consumption goods, using ten different 
budget sets. He found that more than 50% of participants violated GARP. However, both Sippel 
and Battalio et al. measured only the number of GARP violations and not the severity. 
Mattei (2000) used the Afriat Index in three experiments to test whether individuals choose 
consistently. He found a number of violations in participants’ choice behavior, which may be 
conceived as reflecting low levels of GARP inconsistencies. Harbaugh et al. (2001) used GARP 
and the Afriat Index to investigate the severity of choice (in)consistencies in children by asking 
them to decide between bundles of food products. They found that although the level of choice 
consistency appeared already high at the age of seven, the 7-year olds behaved less consistently 
than the 12 year-olds and the adults they studied. Andreoni & Miller (2002) investigated 
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consistency of altruistic behavior using a modified version of a dictator game. They found a high 
degree of heterogeneity between individuals: whereas some individuals behaved consistently 
altruistic or egoistic, others were quite inconsistent in their social preferences.  
We will rely on GARP and the Afriat Index in an experimental setting to obtain more insight 
in choice consistency and budget waste when individuals make decisions relying on intuitive 
versus cognitive processing. To calculate the Afriat Index we construct a choice task in which 
decision-makers have to choose between 4 products on 12 different budget instances, and the 
prices of the products vary across the instances. Individuals have to go through this measurement 
twice, once using their intuition and once relying on cognition. This allows us to assess budget 
loss from choice behavior based on the two types of judgment separately. As the measurements 
are comparable, we can also calculate an overall Afriat Index as an indication of budget waste 
resulting from inconsistent choices made across both types of judgments. As such, these indices 
allow us to compare overall budget waste with budget waste caused by both types of judgments 
separately (cognitive versus intuitive). We use this rationale in two studies. 
 
Study 1 
The goal of the first study was to assess the extent of budget waste resulting from decisions 
relying more on cognitive versus intuitive judgment. 
 
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 138 students from a large university (43.9% women, average age 20.43 
years, SD=2.01). They were invited to come to the lab to complete a task designed to capture the 
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severity of inconsistent choices, in exchange for €12 or 4 course credits. Participants came to the 
lab in groups of 10, and completed the task individually on a pc in a semi-enclosed cubicle.   
 
Design  
Procedure 
As a manipulation of cognitive and intuitive judgments we varied the visceral state hunger. 
A visceral state has a direct hedonic impact and influences the relative desirability of different 
goods and actions (Loewenstein, 1996). Its function is to grab the attention needed to ensure that 
certain actions are taken (e.g., obtaining food when hungry; Loewenstein, 2000). Visceral states 
function with minimal higher-level cognitive mediation, and thus can have a large influence on 
behavior without the interference of cognitive deliberation (LeDoux, 1996; Loewenstein, 2000). 
In general, people who are in a visceral state tend to rely more on intuitive judgments than 
people who are not in a visceral state (Nordgren, et al. 2007).Visceral influences have been 
associated with more intuitive and less deliberative behaviors such as over-eating (Loewenstein, 
2000). In particular, hunger can lead to a variety of behaviors that can be characterized as more 
intuitive than cognitive. For instance, hungry people crave food more (Ditto et al., 2006), tend to 
forget about their weight goals (Nordgren, Van der Pligt  & Van Harreveld, 2008) and spend 
more, even on non-food objects (Xu , Schwarz & Wyer, 2015).  
We used a mixed design consisting of three between-subjects conditions: An experimental 
condition in which intuitive and cognitive judgments were activated sequentially during two 
choice-making episodes, and two control conditions in which only one of the two types of 
judgments was activated (intuitive or cognitive) during both choice-making episodes. In all 
conditions, the measurements were separated by one week (choice-making episodes were 
manipulated within-subjects). Similar to the design of Nordgren et al. (2007), in the hungry 
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(intuition) state participants were instructed to not eat for at least four hours prior to the study. In 
the satiated (cognition) state, participants were instructed to eat a full meal within the hour prior 
to the study. In the experimental condition, participants completed the choice task once hungry 
(intuition) and once satiated (cognition). The order of the tasks was counterbalanced, and did not 
influence the results. In the “cognition” control condition participants were asked to come to the 
lab satiated (eat a full meal within the hour prior to the study) both times, whereas in the 
“intuition” control condition participants were asked to come to the lab hungry both times. In the 
end of each session participants had to declared the time that has passed since their last meal in 
order to check if they followed the instructions. 12 participants that did not follow the 
instructions were not included in the analysis.  
Varian (1988) has argued that, when part of the consumption space is not observed, GARP 
does not have any empirical content. However, recently, Heufer and van Bruggen (2017) showed 
that if the “the rest of the world” remains unchanged during all the decision making problems, 
GARP has empirical content. They showed that, for decisions made within a short time period, 
GARP has an empirical content, while this is not the case for decisions made with a relatively 
large time gap. We included the two control conditions in order to increase confidence that 
potential differences in the Afriat Index between sessions in the experimental condition could be 
attributed to differences between the two types of judgments, rather than to noise driven by the 
one week time lag in between the experimental sessions. We believe that if the differences in the 
consumption patterns between the two sessions in the control condition are similar (i.e. the 
difference is insignificant), this is a good indication that the preferences of the participants did 
not change in the time gap between the two sessions. Therefore, our comparisons in the 
experimental conditions are meaningful.   
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Revealed Preference Task: To be able to calculate the Afriat Index we created a choice task. 
Our task was similar to the one used in studies of Harbaugh et al. (2001) and Bruyneel et al. 
(2012). The task included 12 sequential choice problems, with each choice problem consisting of 
four products: two vice, relatively tasty but not so healthy (chocolate bar and Dorito chips) 
products and two virtue, relatively healthy but not so tasty (baby carrots and raisins) products. 
The prices of the products differed for every choice problem. Participants were asked to indicate 
the quantities they wanted from each product given the different price regimes and their budget 
(10 tokens). For every choice problem participants had to spend their entire budget and had the 
option to choose non-integer quantities. Table 1 presents a summary of our choice task. 
The price-income regime in the task (variation in prices and a fixed budget) implies a high 
power for testing choice consistency, which means that the probability of detecting inconsistent 
behavior is high (Bronars 1987). High power arises from the fact that there is a lot of variation in 
prices and no income variation (Cherchye and Vermeulen 2008). In Appendix A we report some 
more in depth discussion of the notion of power and we present some descriptive statistics for 
our experiment.  
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Table 1: Revealed Preferences Task  
Choice 
Problem 
Prices per 10 gr Budget 
 Carrots Raisins Chocolate 
Bar 
Dorito Chips  
1 5 3 4 4 10 
2 5 4 3 4 10 
3 5 4 4 3 10 
4 3 5 4 4 10 
5 4 5 3 4 10 
6 4 5 4 3 10 
7 3 4 5 4 10 
8 4 3 5 4 10 
9 4 4 5 3 10 
10 3 4 4 5 10 
11 4 3 4 5 10 
12 4 4 3 5 10 
 
Measures  
When completing the choice task, participants had to choose between virtue and vice 
products. To check whether the manipulation of cognitive versus intuitive processing was 
successful, we measured the relative occurrence of virtue and vice choices in both sessions. We 
expected choices in the hungry (intuition) state to be more vicious in nature than choices in the 
satiated (cognition) state. For every respondent we also calculated the Afriat Index for each 
session  separately, as well as the aggregated Afriat Index across both sessions (the type of 
judgment varied across sessions in the experimental condition but remained constant in the 
control conditions). We compared these three different indices to investigate differences in 
severity of choice inconsistencies and budget waste resulting from the different types of 
judgments.  
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Results and Discussion 
Product Choice 
A paired samples test showed that in the experimental condition, respondents chose more 
grams of vice products when hungry than when satiated (see Table 2 and Figure 6), whereas they 
chose fewer grams of virtue products when hungry than when satiated.  In the control conditions 
none of the differences were significant. Specifically, in the cognition control condition the 
quantities of vice and virtue products chosen in the first session were not significantly different 
from those chosen in the second session (See Table 3 and Figure 6). Similarly, in the intuition 
control condition the quantities of vice and virtue chosen in the first session did not differ 
significantly from those chosen in the second session (see Table 4 and Figure 6). 
 
Additionally, we compared the differences between vice choices in the two sessions across 
conditions and did the same for virtues. The comparison showed that the difference in both vice 
and virtue choices for the two sessions was significantly larger in the experimental condition 
than in the two control conditions (combined) (tvice(136)=3.884, p<0.001; tvirtue(136)=2.115, 
p=0.036). 
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Budget Waste 
Comparing the Afriat Indices resulting from choices in both sessions in the experimental 
condition, we found that the difference was insignificant (See Table 2 and figure 7). These 
results indicate that the proportion of the budget wasted was similar for both types of judgments 
(cognitive versus intuitive).  
We also calculated the overall Afriat Index across the two sessions (different types of 
judgments) in a way that allowed us to directly compare it with both indices resulting from 
choices relying on either type of judgment separately. This is possible as the power and thus 
reliability of the choice test depends by construction on three components: the number of 
observations, the price variation, and the choice of budget sets (Cherchye and Vermeulen 2008). 
To meaningfully compare two Afriat Indices these components have to be the same. Therefore 
we constructed an overall Afriat Index with components that were identical to the ones of the 
separate indices. Specifically, we randomly picked six observations from each session dataset for 
each respondent to neutralize the fact that the Afriat Index is sensitive to the number of 
observations. We avoided picking the same price regime twice to secure that the price regime 
and the specific choice sets were identical with that of the within-sessions tests. This yielded a 
dataset consisting of 12 observations per individual that allowed us to calculate an overall, cross-
states Afriat Index that was directly comparable to the separate, within session indices. We 
repeated the same procedure 200 times and calculated the average of the overall Afriat Index for 
every respondent. We observed that the overall index was significantly lower than both indices 
calculated based on choices relying on intuitive versus cognitive judgments, respectively (See 
Table 2). Percentage of budget wasted was approximately 3% for judgments relying on either 
intuition or cognition, whereas overall it was 7%. 
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The difference between the indices in the cognition control condition were all insignificant. 
The Afriat Index calculated from choices in the first session was not significantly different from 
the Afriat Index calculated from choices in the second session (see Table 3). In addition, these 
two indices were not significantly different from the overall index calculated from choices across 
sessions (see Table 3 and Figure 7). The overall Afriat Index was calculated in the same way as 
the overall Afriat Index in the experimental condition (cf. supra). Results were similar for the 
intuition control condition. The index calculated from choices in the first session was not 
significantly different from the index calculated from choices in the second session (see Table 4). 
Neither of these indices was different from the overall index calculated from choices across 
sessions (see Table 4 and Figure 7).  
 
 
We calculated the absolute difference between the overall Afriat Index on the one hand and 
both separate Afriat Indices (which we averaged) on the other in all conditions, and compared 
these differences across conditions. We found that the difference (dexperimental =0.031) in the 
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experimental condition was significantly larger than in the two (pooled) control conditions 
(dcontrol=0.006; t(136)=3.312, p=0.001). 
Additionally, we calculated the Money Pump Index (MPI) as a robustness check for our 
results. The MPI is an alternative measure for the severity of GARP violations.  The basic notion 
behind the MPI is similar to the Afriat Index. However, the two measures differ in their 
interpretation. The MPI “is the monetary magnitude that can be extracted from a consumer that 
violates GARP” (Echenique et al. 2011), while the Afriat Index can be interpreted more as the  
“margin of error” (Varian 1990) that can be allowed to the consumers when making  
consumption choices or as a tolerance for wasted expenditure. Following a suggestion of 
Smeulders et al. (2013), we computed the so-called “average” MPI (defined as the average of the 
“minimum” and “maximum” MPIs). Interestingly, the MPI results are very similar (almost 
identical) to the ones we got when we computed the Afriat Index (for the detailed results, see 
Appendix B). Again, all the comparisons for the control conditions were insignificant (apart 
from one comparison). Moreover, similar to the Afriat Index results, in the experimental 
condition the MPI of the session where participants used their intuition was not significantly 
different from  the one where they used their cognition. However, when we compared these 
MPIs with the overall MPI, we observed a significant increase in the budget wasted in GARP 
violations.  
The findings of our first experiment suggest that the degree of choice inconsistency and 
budget waste resulting from either intuitive or cognitive judgments is comparable. Although 
choice behavior relying on intuition (hungry state) was more vicious (the quantity of vice 
products chosen was larger) compared with choice behavior relying on cognition (satiated state), 
choice inconsistencies and budget wasted resulting from both types of behaviors as measured by 
the Afriat Index were not significantly different. Specifically, budget wasted when relying on 
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intuitive versus cognitive judgments was approximately 3% in both instances, indicating that 
respondents wasted only 3% of the budget on suboptimal choices regardless of whether they 
used their cognition or intuition to decide. However, the overall budget waste across types of 
judgments was significantly higher (7%). Thus, though loss of utility from choice behaviors 
relying on the different types of judgments was similar when assessed separately for each type of 
judgment, the preferences revealed by the two types of judgments had a negative impact on 
utility when pooled and assessed together.  
 
Table 2: Experimental Condition 
Product Choices 
 Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(66) P Virtue t(66) p  
Hungry 211.99 (SD=72.81)   119.87 (SD=70.38)    
Satiated 177,87 (SD=82,20) 3.90 <0.001 149.52 (SD=79.20) 3.49 0.001  
 
Budget Waste 
Sessions Afriat Index Differences 
  Hungry-Satiated Hungry-Overall Satiated-Overall 
  Z P Z p Z p 
Hungry 0.972 (SD=0.081)       
Satiated 0.966 (SD=0.054) -0.261 0.794     
Overall 0.93 (SD=0.077)   -3.836 <0.001 -3.169 0.002 
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Table 3: Cognition Control Condition  
 
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(30) p Virtue t(30) p  
Session 1 186.89 (SD=92.57)   132.55 (SD=92.88)    
Session2 184.14 (SD=85.38) 0.575 0.569 135.58 (SD=82.52) -0.554 0.584  
 
Budget Waste 
Sessions Afriat Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.954 (SD=0.091)       
Session 2 0.951 (SD=0.119) -0.568 0.570     
Overall 0.944 (SD=0.106)   -0.597 0.550 -1.232 0.218 
 
 
Table 4: Intuition Control Condition  
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(39) p Virtue t(39) p  
Session 1 178.00 (SD=80.06)   148.77 (SD=72.97)    
Session 2 176.74 (SD=84.66) 0.230 0.819 149.65 (SD=79.22) 0.158 0.875  
 
Budget Waste 
Sessions Afriat Index Differences 
 Mean Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z P Z p 
Session1 0.962 (SD=0.077)       
Session2 0.954 (SD=0.087) -0.579 0.794     
Overall 0.952 (SD=0.070)   -1.232 0.218 -1.003 0.316 
 
Study 2 
The aim of the second study was to replicate the results of the first study using another 
manipulation of intuitive versus cognitive judgment. To test the robustness of our results, in the 
second study we used another manipulation to trigger intuitive versus cognitive judgments that 
has been used in numerous studies in the past (e.g. Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999; Trope and Alfieri 
1997): cognitive load. Cognitive load prevents individuals from deliberating and makes them use 
their intuition more (Shiv and Fedorikhin, 1999). Furthermore, we wanted to incentivize 
respondents to make utility maximizing choices by increasing the available budget in the choice 
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task (from 10 to 20 tokens) and offering participants one of their choices at the end of the 
session. Participants were told that the will (and actually did) receive the quantities of the 
products they would choose in one of the twelve exercises of the revealed preferences task in the 
end of each session4. This is in contrast to study 1 where choices were hypothetical.    
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 118 students from a large university (60% women, average age 21.18 
years, SD=3.62). They were invited to come to the lab in exchange for €12 or 4 course credits. 
 
Design 
Procedure 
We again made use of a mixed design including three between-subjects conditions, 
completed in two sessions (48 hours difference; manipulated within-subjects). Specifically, in 
the experimental condition a different type of judgment (once intuitive and once cognitive) was 
activated in each session (the order was counterbalanced and did not affect the results), whereas 
in the two control conditions the same type of judgment was activated (either intuitive or 
cognitive) in each session. Specifically, a cognitive load task was used as a manipulation of the 
two types of judgment. That is, participants were asked to keep in mind  a difficult sequence of 8 
different consonants (e.g. GTPWLZKN, high cognitive load or intuitive judgment) or an easy 
sequence of 8 identical consonants (BBBBBBBB, low cognitive load or cognitive judgment) 
(e.g. Van Boven and Robinson, 2012; Beer, Chester and Hughes, 2013). We reasoned that in the 
 
4 In the study participants had to choose the commodities with precision of 0.01 gram. However, the quantities 
participants received in the end of the study were rounded to 1 gram. 
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high cognitive load condition, the intuitive system would become relatively stronger than the 
cognitive system compared to the low cognitive load condition.  
Participants were given a piece of paper displaying the sequence for 90 seconds, and 
were asked to memorize it. In the experimental condition, participants executed the decision task 
(similar to the one used in study 1) while keeping in mind the difficult sequence (intuitive 
judgment) in one of the two sessions, and while keeping in mind the easy sequence (cognitive 
judgment) in the other session. In the cognition control condition participants were asked to keep 
in mind the easy sequence while making their decisions in both of the sessions, whereas in the 
intuition control condition participants had to keep in mind the difficult sequence while making 
decisions in both of the sessions. To ensure that participants put the appropriate effort in the task, 
we checked whether participants managed to reproduce the sequence. All the participants 
managed to reproduce at least 70% of the sequence. Consistent with prior literature, kept all of 
them in the analysis (e.g. Van Boven and Robinson, 2012; Beer, Chester and Hughes, 2013). 
Measures: Similar to the first study, participants had to choose quantities of four products 
(the same 2 virtues and the same 2 vices that were also used in study 1) in each of twelve choice 
situations with different price regimes. As mentioned above, the only difference compared to 
study 1 was that the budget for every choice exercise was doubled. Furthermore, participants 
were (truthfully) told that they would be entitled to one of their chosen product bundles at the 
end of every session. As a manipulation check we again measured the relative virtue and vice 
choices resulting from cognitive versus intuitive judgment. Furthermore, for every respondent 
we calculated the Afriat Index for choices resulting from each type of judgment separately and 
both types of judgments combined. 
 
Results and Discussion 
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Product Choice 
A paired samples test showed again that in the experimental condition respondents chose 
more grams of vice products when they were under high cognitive load than when they were 
under low load, whereas they chose fewer grams of virtue products when under high load than 
when under low load (see Table 5). In the control conditions none of the differences was 
significant. Specifically, in the cognition control condition the quantities of vice and virtue 
products chosen in the first session were not significantly different from those chosen in the 
second session (see table 6). Similarly, in the intuition control condition the quantities of vice 
and virtue chosen in the first session did not differ significantly from those chosen in the second 
session (see Table 7).  
 
 
Additionally, again we compared the difference in vice as well as virtue choices between 
sessions across conditions. The comparison showed once more that the difference in vice choices 
between sessions was significantly larger in the experimental condition than in the two control 
conditions. The difference in virtue choices between sessions was marginally significantly larger 
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in the experimental condition than in the two control conditions (tvice(115)=1.992, p=0.049; 
tvirtue(115)=1.751, p=0.083). This pattern of choice confirms our expectations and replicates the 
findings of study 1. 
 
Budget Waste 
As in study 1, the difference in the Afriat Indices resulting from choices in both sessions in 
the experimental condition was insignificant (Table 5). These results again indicate that the 
proportion of the budget wasted was similar for both types of judgments (cognitive versus 
intuitive). After a similar processing of the data as in Study 1, we calculated the overall Afriat 
Index and compared it with the separate indices. The overall index was significantly lower than 
the other two indices (Table 5). Percentage of budget wasted was approximately 6% for 
judgements relying on either intuition or cognition, whereas overall it was approximately 9%. 
As in Study 1, none of the differences between any of the indices in the control conditions 
was significant. In the cognition control condition, the Afriat Index calculated from choices in 
the first session was not significantly different from the Afriat Index calculated from choices in 
the second session. In addition, these indices were not significantly different from the overall 
index calculated from choices across sessions (Table 6). The results were similar for the intuition 
control condition. The index calculated from choices in the first session was not significantly 
different from the index calculated from choices in the second session, and neither of these 
indices was different from the overall index (Table 7). 
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As in Study 1, we calculated the absolute difference between the overall Afriat Index on the 
one hand and both separate Afriat Indices (which we averaged) on the other in all conditions, and 
compared these differences across conditions. Again, we found that the difference in the 
experimental condition (dexperimental=0.025) was significantly larger than in the two (pooled) 
control conditions (dcontrol=0.009; t(115)=2.110, p=0.037).  
We calculated again MPI as a robustness check. Once more, as in study 1 the results were 
similar the ones we got when we calculated Afriat Index (see Appendix B for more details).  
The purpose of study 2 was to replicate the results of study 1, using a different manipulation 
of cognitive versus intuitive processing. The findings indicate, in line with study 1, that the 
degree of choice inconsistency and budget waste resulting from behaviors relying on either 
intuitive or cognitive judgments is not significantly different, although the behaviors themselves 
(the actual choices being made) differ. However, once more we noticed a significant increase in 
budget waste when calculating the overall budget waste from choices made across situations. 
31 
 
These results confirm that a significant waste of money results from conflicting behaviors 
triggered by the different types of judgments.  
 
Table 5: Experimental Condition 
Product Choices  
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(63) p Virtue t(63) p  
Cognitive load 390.72 (SD=151.07)   257.64 (SD=144.74)    
Non-load 363.34 (SD=168.36) -2.645 0.010 278.57(SD=160.65) 2.097 0.040  
 
Budget Waste 
Sessions Afriat Index Differences 
  Cognitive load-Non-load Cognitive load-Overall Non-load-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Cognitive load 0.937 (SD=0.108)       
Non-load 0.941 (SD=0.106) -0.077 0.939     
Overall 0.913 (SD=0.112)   -2.144 0.032 -2.362 0.018 
 
Table 6 : Cognition Control Condition  
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference    
 Vice t(25) p Virtue t(25) p  
Session 1 327.58 (SD=146.85)   313.91 (SD=143.32)    
Session 2 339.23 (SD=152.04) -0.981 0.337 307.10 (SD=138.94) 0.487 0.631  
 
Budget Waste 
Sessions Afriat Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.943 (SD=0.093)       
Session 2 0.934 (SD=0.123) -0.063 0.950     
Overall 0.931 (SD=0.100)   -0.511 0.609 -0.795 0.427 
 
 
Table 7: Intuition Control Condition  
Product Choices 
Sessions Products Difference Products Difference  
 Vice t(27) p Virtue t(27) p  
Session 1 394.28 (SD=119.50)   255.51 (SD=121.26)    
Session 2 388.26 (SD=128.29) 0.417 0.680 260.43 (SD=125.29) -0.336 0.740  
 
Budget Waste 
States Afriat Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.946 (SD=0.110)       
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Session 2 0.945 (SD=0.113) -0.051 0.959     
Overall 0.939 (SD=0.105)   -0.621 0.535 -0.672 0.501 
 
 
General Discussion  
We conducted two studies to assess the degree of choice inconsistency from reliance on 
intuitive and cognitive judgment. Results of both studies indicate that the extent of budget 
wasted resulting from choices relying on either of both types of judgments is not significantly 
different, despite the fact that product choices differ. However, a further analysis revealed that 
the discrepancy between choices made under the influence of intuitive judgments on the one 
hand and cognitive judgments on the other had a negative impact on overall budget waste, as 
measured by the overall Afriat Index calculated from choices across situations in which intuitive 
and cognitive judgments were activated. This finding suggests that the discrepancy between 
choices resulting from the different types of judgment is responsible for a significant loss of 
decision utility.  
Our findings provide an answer to the question as to which type of judgment leads to more 
severe choice inconsistencies. Our studies are the first to estimate how severe inconsistent 
choices resulting from intuitive versus cognitive judgment are. Our findings show that both types 
of judgments lead to an equal degree of choice inconsistency. Previous studies showing that 
cognitive judgment leads to more choice inconsistency have measured either the number of 
transitivity errors (Lee et al., 2009) or the extent of attitude inconsistency towards products 
(Nordgren & Dijksterhuis, 2009). However, transitivity errors differ in terms of their impact on 
budget waste (Harbaugh et al. 2001; Echenique, Lee, & Shum 2011), as does the degree of 
attitude inconsistency. The authors attributed the choice and attitude inconsistencies they 
observed to cognitive noise, but our data suggest that cognitive noise may have a minor impact 
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on overall budgeting efficiency. Furthermore, another research stream suggesting that intuitive 
judgment leads to less optimal choice making (Van den Bergh, Dewitte & Warlop, 2008; Shiv et 
al., 2005) has identified these suboptimal choices as biased by affective noise related to intuitive 
processes. Our data however suggest that affective noise only has a minor impact on overall 
budgeting efficiency. Although intuitive judgments have been found to lead to some types of 
suboptimal decisions such as temporal discounting and more risk seeking, there is a set of 
findings suggesting that intuition is not by definition harmful and that its impact depends on the 
context and the type of decisions (e.g. Pocheptsova et al., 2009).  
Compared to previous research studying the influence of cognitive versus intuitive judgment 
on choice consistency, our study is the first to include some important components in the 
experimental setting that have been ignored by previous studies: 1) a non-binary setting 
(respondents had to choose between more than two products), 2) the use of budget constraints 
and 3) the price variation. Theses added components may also have contributed to the 
discrepancy between previous findings and ours. Binary choice settings and pairwise 
comparisons have been shown to be particularly vulnerable to changes in attribute importance 
(Rieskamp, Busemeyer & Mellers, 2006). Furthermore, available budgets and prices are 
important drivers of economic decisions, as they set the broader context under which these 
decisions take place and thus define the level of consistent behavior (Becker, 1962; 1993; 
Samuelson, 1938). We show both types of judgments to be equally appropriate for making 
consistent economic decisions. The symmetry in our findings suggests that the decision making 
rules followed by intuition and cognition in economic contexts involving price regimes and 
budget constraints might not be all that different. This is consistent with recent proposals 
suggesting that cognitive and intuitive judgments can be based on common principles in certain 
environments (Kruglanski & Gigerenzer, 2011). Specifically, Kruglanski & Gigerenzer (2011) 
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argue that in some environments in which relevant cues are set (for example in our case the 
budget constraints and price regimes) and the decisions are made sequentially, the two types of 
judgments will rely on the same rules to reach a decision. By rules the authors refer to the 
inferential devices used for categorization, estimation, paired comparisons, and other judgmental 
tasks that go beyond the given information.  
Our findings can be related to literature on affective forecasting errors and hot-cold (and 
cold-hot) empathy gaps. Kahneman & Thaler, (2006) argued that when people make choices 
they tend to forecast utility of an outcome. When the forecast is wrong, decision-makers 
experience loss of utility in the future. For example, a very hungry shopper doing his/her weekly 
shopping at the beginning of the week may buy very large portions of food or a greater variety in 
food products, and end up having (too much) food at home that s/he does not like very much. On 
the other hand, satiated shoppers who underestimate the value of hedonic products will focus on 
a specific set of goods, and end up with a basket of products that they do not really want to 
consume when hungry. In both cases, wrong forecasting results in loss of experienced utility at 
time of consumption (Kahneman & Thaler, 2006). Although we did not directly test forecasting 
errors, we show how the gap between the two types of judgments prevents individuals from 
forming global preferences that will enable them to make more optimal decisions. A hungry 
shopper (relying on intuitive judgments) forms his/her preferences between various products as if 
the importance of the products and their prices will still be the same for him/her when satiated 
(when s/he will be relying on cognition to make his/her choices). Our findings show that the 
actual dissimilarity in the preferences can lead to severe inconsistencies which end up in a 
significant waste of budget from an overall perspective.  
We contribute to the literature on economic decision making by showing that loss of utility 
due to inconsistent choices is not a result of the decisions driven by one specific type of 
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judgment directly, but of the conflicting choices driven by these two types of judgment 
separately instead. We speculate that in order to reach the indifference levels that allow them to 
choose products, individuals using either intuition or cognition give weights to the attributes of 
the products, which very often differ. For instance, “taste” is perceived and weighted as more 
important by intuition than by cognition (Fisher & Rangel, 2014). One result of such a 
dissimilarity in attribute weights is that the levels of indifference between various products 
reached by both types of judgment are different (Goldstein, 1990). Such dissimilar indifference 
levels should prevent decision-makers from moving to higher indifference curves and thus 
optimize the use of their budgets across decision situations in which they rely on different types 
of judgments.  
Taking a broader perspective, our results suggest that self-control strategies characterized by 
anticipation of an upcoming event and the deployment of certain means to prevent one’s future 
self from acting on desire, can have a negative impact on preference consistency. Employing 
strategies such as counteractive self-control, guilt, or other complex incentive schemes (e.g. 
Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002; Fishbach, Dhar & Zhang, 2006) which bring more conflict 
between the two types of judgment might lead to more suboptimal choices from an overall 
perspective. For instance, a hungry shopper trying to suppress the weight of an attribute such as 
taste (counteractive self-control) might reach indifference levels between products that differ 
from the levels reached in a hungry as well as from those reached in a satiated state (as 
preferences across types of judgment seem hard to predict). Creating a third level of indifference 
may drive the overall waste of budget to even higher levels. Techniques aimed at increasing the 
connection between intuition and cognition might yield better results. Bartels & Urminsky 
(2011) found that increasing the connection between current and future self by using techniques 
such as manipulating perceived stability of one’s identity decreased temporal discounting rates.  
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Similarly, Goukens et al (2009) showed that highlighting one’s identity by promoting self-
awareness led to more stable preferences and reduced decision biases. We speculate that such 
treatments may increase the cross-state alignment and reduce overall budget waste. Future 
research could test this hypothesis. 
Furthermore, recent findings suggested that some product attributes have a larger impact on 
discrepancy in evaluations between intuitive and cognitive judgments. For example taste ratings 
(for the same products) are different when people are hungry compared with when they are 
satiated, whereas healthiness ratings do not differ (Fisher & Rangel, 2014). Future research could 
investigate which product attributes lead to more severe choice inconsistencies and hence to 
more severe budget inefficiency. These findings could potentially inform us on how different 
packaging and advertising strategies could contribute to making individuals’ choices more 
optimal.  
Future studies could investigate whether certain personality traits may moderate the effect of 
internal or external cues shifting the balance between intuition and cognition, and hence budget 
waste, because they chronically make one of the two systems relatively more dominant. Trait 
self-control may reduce the influence of intuitive judgment, which would lead to fewer 
discrepancies between the two types of judgment, to less choice inconsistencies, and to less 
budget waste.  
Future research could also shed more light on forecasting errors and budget misuse by 
assessing the Afriat Index (both individual and overall) of choices made in an intuitive state 
when in fact making decisions for a cognitive state and vice versa. The findings of such a study 
could help us to further understand whether and how it is possible to better connect preferences 
of different types of judgments in order to have a positive influence on the overall rationality. 
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Understanding the ways intuition and cognition can be connected will provide opportunities to 
improve individuals’ welfare.   
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Appendix A 
 
In the first table we present the results for the Bronars (1987) power measure. Basically, a power 
analysis evaluates the probability of detecting an alternative hypothesis to the model under study. 
Bronars defines the alternative hypothesis as “irrational behavior”, which states that individuals 
randomly choose consumption bundles (drawn from the uniform distribution) that exhaust the 
available budget. Bronars' power measure then captures the probability of rejecting the rationality 
hypothesis for such randomly drawn consumption bundles. 
In contrast to the bootstrap power measure that we discuss next, this Bronars power measure 
does not take into account the choices made by the individuals in our experiment and, thus, 
maximally focuses on the experimental design. That is, the Bronars measure basically quantifies 
whether the selected price-income regimes guarantee, in principle, enough discriminatory power 
to detect random behavior. With an average Bronars power of 0.78  (i.e. in  78% of the cases 
random behavior is detected), this is clearly the case.  
Next, in the following tables we report descriptive statistics for the so-called bootstrap power 
measure (see, for example, Andreoni & Miller, 2002), in which the observed empirical choices are 
incorporated in the power measure. To be precise, for the Bronars power measure the uniform 
distribution is used to model random behavior, while for the bootstrap power the empirical 
distribution is used. Given that the price-income regimes are the same across experiments and 
treatments, Bronars power is the same . The same does not hold for the Bootstrap power because 
it depends on the empirical distribution in the treatment conditions. In short, the reported results 
show that on average the bootstrap power is slightly higher than the Bronars power, which 
confirms once more that we have a powerful experiment.  
 
 
 
Bronar’s Power 
 Afriat’s Index 
Mean 0.779 
SD 0.055 
Min 0.638 
Median 0.789 
Max 0.913 
 
 
Experiment 1: Bootstrap 
 
 
Bootstrap Power– Cognition Control Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.875 0.876 0.761 
SD 0.098 0.011 0.081 
Min 0.600 0.600 0.599 
Median 0.883 0.879 0.760 
Max 1 1 1 
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Bootstrap Power– Intuition Control Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.894 0.904 0.796 
SD 0.098 0.089 0.086 
Min 0,600 0,600 0.600 
Median 0,900 0,920 0.788 
Max 1 1 1 
 
Bootstrap Power– Experimental Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.900 0.917 0.805 
SD 0.092 0.089 0.085 
Min 0.640 0.600 0.600 
Median 0.910 0.950 0,800 
Max 1 1 1 
 
 
Experiment 2: Bootstrap 
 
Bootstrap Power– Cognition Control Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.877 0.892 0.761 
SD 0.110 0.114 0.088 
Min 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Median 0.897 0.920 0.750 
Max 1 1 1 
 
 
Bootstrap Power– Intuition Control Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.897 0.894 0.776 
SD 0.113 0.110 0.106 
Min 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Median 0.940 0.925 0,770 
Max 1 1 1 
‘ 
 
Bootstrap Power– Experimental Condition 
 Afriat’s Index 
 Session 1 Session 2 Overall 
Mean 0.875 0.884 0.755 
SD 0.111 0.111 0.097 
Min 0.600 0.600 0.600 
Median 0.897 0.905 0.755 
Max 1 1 0.987 
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Appendix B 
 
Money Pump Index 
 
Study 1 
 
Cognition Control Condition  
Sessions Money Pump Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.016 (SD=0.038)       
Session 2 0.018 (SD=0.043) -0.646 0.518     
Overall 0.0208 (SD=0.037)   -1.737 0.082 -1.607 0.108 
 
 
Intuition Control Condition  
Sessions Money Pump Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
 Mean Z p Z P Z p 
Session1 0.015 (SD=0.029)       
Session2 0.009 (SD=0,019) -1.095 0.563     
Overall 0.015 (SD=0.023)   -0.114 0.909 -2.48 0.013 
 
 
Experimental Condition 
Sessions Money Pump Index Differences 
  Hungry-Satiated Hungry-Overall Satiated-Overall 
  Z P Z p Z p 
Hungry 0.0104 (SD=0.023)       
Satiated 0.009 (SD=0.019) -0.120 0.904     
Overall 0.021 (SD=0.026)   -3.994 <0.001 -3.884 <0.001 
 
Difference between overall MPI and the average MPI of the two individual MPI (Experimental 
Condition): dexperimental =0.021 
Difference between the overall MPI and the average MPI of the two individual MPI (Pooled 
Control Conditions: dcontrol=0.003;  
t(136)=5.535, p<0.001.  
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Study 2 
 
Cognition Control Condition  
 
Sessions Money Pump Index Differences 
        
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.024 (SD=0.038)       
Session 2 0.017 (SD=0.040) -0.795 0.427     
Overall 0.028 (SD=0.039)   -0.308 0.758 -1.538 0.124 
 
Intuition Control Condition  
States Money Pump Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Session1-Overall Session2-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Session 1 0.035 (SD=0.081)       
Session 2 0.018 (SD=0.036) -0.078 0.937     
Overall 0.022 (SD=0.037)   -1.681 0.093 -1.112 0.266 
 
 
Experimental Condition  
 
States Money Pump Index Differences 
  Session 1-Session 2 Load-Overall Non-Load-Overall 
  Z p Z p Z p 
Load 0.023 (SD=0.042)       
Non-Load 0.024 (SD=0.046) -0.007 0.995     
Overall 0.032 (SD=0.043)   -2.164 0.030 -2054 0.040 
 
Difference between overall MPI and the average MPI of the two individual MPI (Experimental 
Condition): dexperimental =0.008. 
Difference between the overall MPI and the average MPI of the two individual MPI (Pooled 
Control Conditions: dcontrol=0.004. 
t(115)=1.25, p=0.214.  
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Appendix C 
Instructions for the revealed preferences task 
Dear Respondent  
 
This task contains 12 different exercises in which you are asked to indicate your preferences on your 
favorite bundle of goods. In each task you have a certain budget (10 tokens) that you may freely devote 
to four different products: baby carrots, raisins, chocolate bars, or Dorito chips. In each exercise you will 
be asked to enter the quantity (in grams) of each product you want to consume in the indicated prices. 
The prices of the products (also expressed in tokens) are different in each exercise.  
Please make your choices as truthful as possible. You will be given one of your choices in the end of 
the experiment.  
How to carry out the experiment 
In each exercise you will be asked to indicate the quantity of each product (in grams) you wish to 
consume in the gray colored cells. The gray cells take the default value of 0 if not filled. The green cells 
show the value (expressed in tokens) of the quantity of each products you have chosen to consume. The 
yellow cells display the maximum amount of each product you can consume with the available budget. 
The pink cell shows the total amount of the budget that has been spent. You should always spend the 
entire budget. If the amount spent is not exactly 10 tokens, the cell under "Budget Control" will display 
the message "Your total payout is not exactly 10”. If the expenditures are equal to 10, the cell will 
display the message “OK”.   
Some useful information: 
 
1)The exercises use tokens as a method of payment. For every task you have a budget of 10 tokens. The 
price of each product is also expressed in tokens. A budget of 10 tokens is not equal to 10 euros. 
2) The given prices are for 10 gr of each products. For example if the prices of Dorito Chips is 5 you can 
buy 10 gr of Dorito Chips with 5 tokens. The photo below shows 10 grams of each product for your 
reference. 
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3) You are allowed to consume 0 grams of a product. Negative consumption or consumption that 
exceeds the given budget is not permitted. In both situations you will receive an error message. 
 
4) You should always spend the entire budget. In case you have not spent the entire budget the cell 
under "Budget Control" will display the message "Your total payout is not exactly 10".  
5) Every exercise must be carried out correctly. If a task is not properly completed or the information 
filled in is not in the correct order (example, exercise 1, exercise... 12), the first two cells in each exercise 
will display the message “Please return to the previous exercise to enter the right data. If everything is 
carried out correctly the same cell will display the message “You may proceed”.  
6) You have the choice to modify the exercises indefinitely until you are convinced that the entered 
quantities correspond to your preferences.  
7) In the end of every exercise there is a graph displaying the quantities you have chosen to consume. 
 
Example of how participants could carry out the revealed preferences task 
To get familiarized with the design, it is recommended to carry out the following exercise.  
You can fill the quantity you would like to consume for each product in the grey cells. The green cells 
indicate the amount of budget spent in each product. In order to stay within your budget you should 
choose (for each product) a quantity ranges between 0 and the maximum amount displayed in the 
yellow cells. The value in the yellow cells (maximum quantity) will automatically adjust to the quantities 
you have entered in the grey cells. Please continue indicating your preferences until you have spent the 
entire budget.  
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For example, if you wish to consume 14 gr of baby carrots then enter 14 in the cell B11. The green cell 
(B12) will automatically show the value of 7 depicting the amount of budget spent to consume 14 of 
baby carrots. The green cell B13 will show the value of 20 indicating that you still can consume 7 gr of 
baby carrots to spent the entire budget, assuming that you will consume 0 gr of the other products. Cell 
C13 will show the value of 10 indicating that you can consume 10 gr raisins, given the fact the you will 
consume 14 gr of baby carrots and 0 gr of chocolate bars and Dorito chips.  
 
 
If you wish to consume 5 gr of raisins you have the budget to consume 4,29 gr of chocolate bars, 
assuming that you consume 14 gr of baby carrots and 0 of Dorito chips. 
 
 
 
If you consume less than 4,29 gr of chocolate bars you will still have the budget to consume in the rest 
of the products. By choosing to consume 3 gr of chocolate bar and 1,29 gr of Dorito chips you will have 
spent all the budget. The cell under "Budget Control" will display the message “OK” which means that 
you can proceed to the next exercise. If you are not satisfied with the selected quantities, you can still 
change them. Be aware of the fact that you are not obliged to consume all the products if you do not 
wish to.   
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